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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 14433

vs.
RICHARD CAUBLE,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County upon an information alleging a violation
of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-404, in that he
"exercised unauthorized control over cash in excess of $1,000
belonging to Western Leisure Industries with intent to deprive
the said Western Leisure Industries thereof.n
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried in the Fourth Judicial District
Court in and for Utah County, Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge,
presiding.

Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to

serve not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison.

It is from that verdict and judgement that the

Defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction or failing
that, a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

In November 1974, the defendant worked for a company
known as Western Leisure Industries as General Manager of their
Payson plant (T 94, 126). The authority of the defendant in that
position included picking up checks on trailers sold to dealers
(T 26, 183),delivery of checks to the comptrollers office in Salt ,
Lake City (T 56, 173, 174, 183) and deposit of checks (T 112, 132).
On November 13, 1974, the defendant received a cashiers check in
the amount of $9,262 from one Boyd Wheelwright representing payment
for trailers purchased by Mr. Wheelwright from Western Leisure
Industries (T 49).

Defendant took the check to Salt Lake City, where

instead of delivering the check to the comptroller, Mr. Giles, he
opened a new account for the Mansford Corporation, a corporation
wholly owned by defendant, at the Sugarhouse branch of Tracy-Collins
Bank and Trust Company, Salt Lake City.

The defendant received cash

in the amount of $262, a cashiers check in the amount of $4,917.66
made payable to Blazon Corporation, and the balance wag deposited
to the Mansford account (T 74). The Blazon Corporation was the
sole stockholder of Western Leisure Industries. The Blazon check
was delivered to the comptroller, Mr. Giles, in Salt Lake City
and was given a promissory note by Mr. Giles in the amount of the
check (T 28, 29). At the close of the State's case, the defense
counsel moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the
State had failed to prove that the offense occurred within Utah
County (T 86).

The Court denied the motion pro forma (T 87).

Defendant testified on direct examination that he
deposited the funds to cover a claim he had against Western
Leisure Industries for wages, expenses and car allowance amounting
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to between $9,500 and $10,000 (T 97). Defendant discussed his
claim against the company with Mr. Giles and with a Mr. Boyd
Saderup, the President of Western Leisure Industries and Blazon,
Inc., prior to offsetting the claim against receivables (T 109-110)
as well as subsequent thereto (T 115-116).
Upon cross examination of the defendant, the prosecutor
asked the following:
Q.

Mr. Gauble, I believe you testified that during
the course of your direct testimony, that you
did not offset any accounts receivable from
the company, other than the check involved in
this transaction?

A.

That fs correct.

Q.

And that is the Wheelwright transaction?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

Did you ever collect checks from anybody for
the sale of trailers or any other materials
from Western Leisure Industries that you
kept the money on? (T 148)

Subsequent to that series of questions, the prosecutor
asked about a specific instance where the defendant had deposited
a check from Jordan Nurseries in Salt Lake City made payable to
Western Leisure Industries dated August 21, 1974, to his Mansford
Inc. account in the Bank of Salt Lake (T 149, 151, 161, 162). The
prosecutor then further questioned the defendant concerning a check
dated October 1974 from Dixon, Inc., of Reno, Nevada made payable
to the Mansford Corporation (T 152-156).

Counsel for defendant

objected to the admission of a proposed Exhibit 40 (a letter
concerning the Dixon, Inc., traisaction) as being immaterial
and further objected to the entire line of questioning of the
prosecutor as being beyond the scope of direct examination (T 159).
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The Court upheld the objection as to the admissibility of the
Exhibit 40, but allowed the prosecutor to proceed with his same
line of questioning (T 160). The prosecutor then proceeded to
question the defendant about the Dixon, Inc., check, the Jordan
Nursery check and an additional check from a Roberta Swenson
(Exhibit 37)(T 159-167).
The prosecutor then offered plaintifffs Exhibits 34,
35, 36 and 37 (these exhibits were checks and deposit slips
regarding the foregoing transactions) to which the defense counsel
objected upon the grounds that the exhibits were not material and
further moved once again that the line of testimony concerning
the exhibits was inadmissible and immaterial and requested that it
all be stricken (T 167). The Court overruled defense counselfs
objection to the admission of exhibits and overruled defense counsel's
motion to strike (T 167). The prosecutor then recalled Mr. David
Giles, the comptroller, for Western Leisure Industries who testified
concerning the Dixon, Inc., transaction (T 185). The prosecution
then offered Exhibits 38 and 40 (Exhibit 38 was a check stub and
Exhibit 40 was a letter relating to the Dixon, Inc., transaction)
to which defense counsel objected as being immaterial (T 186). The
Court overruled the objection and received Exhibits 38 and 40 (T 186).
The prosecutor then questioned Mr. Giles further
concerning the Dixon, Inc., transaction and offered

Exhibit 39, a

copy of the check of Dixon, Inc., to Mansford, Inc., in the amount
of $1,000.

Defense counsel objected to the admission of the

exhibit on the grounds that it was not material.

The Court again

overruled defense counsel's objection and received Exhibit 39
(T 188-189).
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During the State's summation, the prosecutor spent
a substantial portion of his time, pointing out to the Jury the
transactions which occurred prior to the 14th of November, 1974.
The prosecutor challenged the credibility of the defendant, by
using the testimony and exhibits relating to the prior transactions
(T 199-203).
The Jury returned the verdict guilty as charged.

After

the verdict was entered, defense counsel renewed his motion for
a directed verdict and the Court allowed defense counsel to submit
a brief in support thereof (T 216), the Court later denied the
motion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

DEFENDANT WAS TRIED IN UTAH COUNTY IN VIOLATION OF HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A TRIAL IN THE COUNTY WHERE THE CRIME
OCCURRED.
The Utah State Constitution grants the defendant the
right to be tried in the county in which the crime was alleged
to have been committed through Article I, Section 12, which
provides:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusations
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify
in his own behalf, to be confronted by witnesses
against him, to have compulsory processes to
compel attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed. (Emphasis added)
In addition to Article I, Section 12, Article VIII,
Section 5 provides in part:
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All civil and criminal business arising in any
county, must be tried in such county, unless
a change of venue be taken, in such cases as
may be provided by law.
Both of the foregoing constitutional provisions clearly
provide for trial in the county in which the crime is committed.
However, Utah Annotated Section 76-1-202 (iii) provides for trial
in any county in which the defendant exerts control over the
property:
A person who commits theft may be tried in any
county in which he exerts control over the
property affected.
This statute is unconstitutional in that it modifies
the right to trial in the county in which the crime was committed
as guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 and Article VIII, Section
5 of the Utah State Constitution.

The language of Utah Code

Annotated 76-6-202 (iii) clearly allows trial in a county in
which none of the elements of the crime occurred, by the use
of the term "control". The statute which the defendant is charged
with violating is Utah Code Annotated 76-6-404, which provides:
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
The two critical elements of the crime are obtaining
or exercising unauthorized control of property of another and with
a purpose to deprive.

In the present case, there was no evidence

of any unauthorized control over the property (cash) in Utah
County.

The defendant had authority to exercise control over

the property in Utah County and take the property to Salt Lake
County.
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In considering a former Utah State statute which
provided that trial may be had in either of two counties where
part of the crime was committed in one county and part in another,
the Court stated:
Before that section can become operative in any
criminal case, one of two things must appear:
Either, first, the offense must be divisible,
and each part be unlawful in and of itself, and
committed at a different time and place; or
second, the offense must consist of more than
one act, each of which acts, or effect of such
acts, must constitute an unlawful element of
the offense, without the presence of which the
offense could not be consummated. The mere
existence in some other county than the place
of trial of acts or conditions of the defendant
lawful in and of themselves, but necessary to
be alleged and proven in order to establish the
crime charged, does not invoke the power of
this statute, so as to permit the trial of the
defendant in some other county. State v Graham,
23 Utah 278, 64 P 557, 559.
Utah Code Annotated 76-2-101 requires the union of
act and intent before a defendant is culpable.

In this case,

there must have been an unauthorized control over property
and an intent to permanently deprive before the crime is culpable.
Since the unauthorized control did not occur, if at all, until the
defendant disposited the check in Salt Lake County the following
day, the crime was not committed in Utah County.
The Utah Supreme Court dealt

with the provision of

Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah State Constitution in State v
Cox, 106 Utah 853, 147 P 2d 858 (1944) where the Court ruled that
a defendant must be tried in the County in which the crime was
committed.
The court of other states have found provisions which
allowed the prosecution of offenses in counties other than the county
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wherein the crime was committed unconstitutional.

In an

annotation in 76 A.L.R. 1034, Constitutionality of Statute for
Prosecution of Offense in County, Other than That in which it was
Committed, Section 2, at 1036 it is stated:
But where the Constitution of the State guarantees
to an accused a trial by an impartial jury of the
county in which the offense has been committed, it
has generally been held that a statute giving
jurisdiction of a prosecution to the courts of a
county other than that in which the offense has
been committed is void as denying to the offender
the constitutional right of trial in his county
of vicinage. Walls v State (1877) 32 Ark. 565;
Dempsey v State (1894) 94 Ga. 766, 22 S.E. 57;
State v Moore (1916) 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965;
Ex parte Slater (1880) 72 Mo. 102; State v McGraw
(1885) 87 Mo. 161; State v Hatch (1887) 91 Mo. 568,
4 S.W. 502; State v Smiley (1889) 98 Mo. 605;
12 S.W. 247; State v Mispagel (1907) 207 Mo. 557,
106 S.W. 513; State v Carroll (1909) 55 Wash. 588,
133 Am. St. Rep. 1047, 104 Pac. 814, 19 Ann. Cas.
1234; State v Reese (1920) 112 Wash. 507, 11 A.L.R.
1018, 192 Pac. 934.
In State v Carroll, 55 Wash. 588, 104 Pac. 814, cited
in the foregoing annotation, a statute providing for trial of a
theft offense in either the county of the theft or the county where
the property was found to be unconstitutional.

Also, in Addison v

State, 199 Kan. 554, 431 P. 2d 532 (1967), the Kansas Supreme Court
stated that where the statute is subject to constitutional restriction,
the construction of the statute must be within such constitutional
boundaries or else the statute is void.

The court in Addison, supra

dealt with a constitutional provision which accorded defendants the
same right to a "speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense was alleged to have been
committed11 as does Article I, section 12 of the Utah State Constitution.
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As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v Betensen,
14 U. 2d 121, 378 P 2d 669 (1963), it is fundamental that a statute
which contravenes a constitutional provision is void.
Therefore, since 76-1-202 (iii) permits prosecution
for an offense in a county other than the county in which the crime
was committed, the constitutional right of the defendant to be
tried by a jury in the county wherein the offense was committed
has been violated and his conviction snould be reversed.
POINT II. THE STA1E FAILED TO PROVE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.
Defendant was charged in the information with a
violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-404 in that "on the 13th
day of November, 1974, at Utah County, State of Utah, said
Richard Mansford Cauble exercised unauthorized control over cash
in excess of $1,000 belonging to Western Leisure Industries with
the intent to deprive the said Western Leisure Industries thereof11.
The testimony of both the State!s witnesses and that
of the defendant clearly established that no unauthorized control
of cash or any other property took place in Utah County.

The

testimony of Mr. Giles, Mr. Saderup and the appellant was that
defendant had the authority to pick up checks and take them to
Salt Lake City to Mr. Giles. Therefore, the defendant could not
have exercised unauthorized control in Utah County.
Utah Code Annotated 76-2-101 requires both unlawful
conduct and intent or a union of act and intent.
case there was no unlawful conduct in Utah County.

In the present
The alleged

unlawful conduct did not occur until the following day, November
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14, 1974, in Salt Lake County when he took the check to the
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company and deposited it for his
benefit.
Therefore, the trial court should have granted defense
counsel's Motion for Directed Verdict.
POINT III. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS PREJUDICED BY THE
ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS AND TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE COMMISSION OF
OTHER CRIMES OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT BEEN CONVICTED.
Defendant was questioned concerning whether or not he
had taken money on other occasions (T 148). Defendant replied no.
(T 148) The prosecution then proceeded to inquire of defendant
concerning certain specific instances when he had allegedly taken
money without authorization. (T 151-167)
These alleged acts were of such a nature as to
constitute the crime of theft, the very crime of which the
defendant was charged in the instant case.
Defense counsel objected to the questions and to the
entire line of questioning (T 159) but his objections were overruled as was his motion to strike (T 167). The error was
compounded by the introduction of Exhibit 34, 35, 36, 37, 39 and
40.
These exhibits consisted of checks which the defendant
was alleged to have taken and deposited to his own account
deposit slips which clearly had no material relation, to the
allegations of the crime defendant was charged with in the
present case.
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and

This Court has considered the question of whether a
defendant may be questioned concerning a crime or wrong of which
he has not been convicted on several occasions.

In State v Dixon

12 U 2d 8, 361 P 2d 412 (1961) the defendant, on trial for robbery
was questioned concerning a criminal incident in which the defendant
had been involved but not convicted.

The Court found the bounds

of cross examination to have been exceeded and the incident to be
immaterial to the natter before the Court.
In State v Kazda, 14 U 2d 266, 382 P 2d 407 (1963)
this Court held that testimony given by a Statefs witness concerning
questioning of defendant by the witness in regard to various crimes
the commission of which defendant had denied was prejudicial.

At.

382 P 2d 409, the Court stated:
We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial
error. It implied that the defendant was
implicated in other crimes, none of them proven,
and could have no other effect than to degrade
the defendant and give the jury the impression
that he had a propensity for crime.
In the present case, the defendant was not only
questioned concerning other crimes, but the prosecutor proceeded
to offer evidence and testimony concerning those crimes although
the defendant had not been convicted nor even charged with the
commission of those crimes.

The defendant was put in the

position of either having to invoke his privilege against selfincrimination before the jury or attempt to explain or deny the
commission before the jury, either of which would undoubtedly
prejudice the jury.
A similar result was reached by the Court in State
v Peterson, 23 U 2d 58, 457 P 2d 532 (1969) where the defendant
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was charged with the sale of LSD and the Court found questions
of the prosecutor of the defendant concerning his use of marijuana,
itself a crime, to be prejudicial.
The Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 55, prohibits the use
of evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a
specified occasion to prove his disposition to commit crime or
civil wrong on another specified occasion except to prove a
material fact such as absence of mistake or accident, motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity.
In the instant case, none of the above exceptions allowing thi
admission of such evidence is met.

The clear objective of ttie

prosecutor in questioning the defendant concerning prior crimes
was to discredit his testimony and to degrade the defendant.

A

considerable portion of the trial was concerned with the uncharged
and unproven allegations.

The prosecutor also spent a considerable

amount of time during his summation drawing the attention of the
jurors to the uncharged incidents.

The jury had the exhibits

relating to those matters with them for their perusal during
their deliberations.

It is difficult to imagine how the jury

could fairly deliberate upon the relevant issues concerning the
offense with which appellant was charged.
Had the appellant been previously convicted of theft
in each of those previous transactions, the prosecutor would have
be£n iimitld to simply inquiring as to whether or not appellant
had been convicted and could not have gone into each incident to
fe.K§ |f|ll extent and detail as he was allowed in this case.
therefore, the trial court committed prejudicial
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error in allowing inquiry and evidence relating to acts of which
the appellant had not been convicted.
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Annotated 76-1-202 (iii) violates the
right to trial in the county wherein the crime is committed as
guaranteed by Article I, section 12 of the Utah State Constitution
since it allows prosecution in a county other than the one in
which the crime is committed.

Appellant was therefore improperly

tried in Utah County.
Under the information as charged, the State failed to
prove that appellant committed a crime in Utah County as is the
burden of the State in a criminal case.
The appellant was denied a fair trial by the inquiry
of the prosecutor into prior instances of illegal activity on the
part of defendant of which he had not yet been convicted and
further by the introduction of evidence concerning those uncharged
acts.
Wherefore, the conviction of appellant herein should
be reversed.
DATED this

^/

day of July, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN
Utah County Legal Defender Association, Inc.
107 E. 100 S.
Provo, UT 84601
Attorney for Appellant
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